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NOTE
AFTER BLONDER-TONGUE: BACK TO THE LABORATORY
TO FIND A PATENT VALIDATION SYSTEM EVEN A COURT
COULD TRUST
Collateral estoppel doctrine long permitted a patentee whose pat-
ent once had been invalidated in an infringement suit to initiate a
subsequent action against another alleged infringer without regard
to the first decision of invalidity.' Since the second alleged infringer
was not a party to the frst action, the requirement of mutuality
prevented his benefiting from the prior holding of invalidity as a
defense in the second suit.2 Likewise, because the patentee could not
assert any holding of validity against the second infringer, the valid-
ity of a patent could be litigated afresh numerous times in succes-
sive infringement suits.3
1. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936). See Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back:
Collateral Estoppel in Patent Litigation-A New Look, 18 VMi.. L. Rzv. 207 (1972). See also
Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y 561
(1970).
2. See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936). In Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912), the Supreme Court declared the requirement of
mutuality "a principle of general elementary law." See also 69 GEo. L.J. 1126 (1972); Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 208.
The RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) states: "A person who is not a party... to
an action in which a valid judgment other than a judgment in rem is rendered (a) cannot
directly or collaterally attack the judgment, and (b) is not bound by or entitled to claim the
benefits of an adjudication upon any matter decided in the action." See also Halpern,
Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion and Analysis, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 761, 763-65 (1971) (Part
I); Smith, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Prior Judgment of Patent Invalidity: Blonder-
Tongue Revisited, 55 J. PAT. Opp. Soc'y 285, 290 (1973) (Part 1).
A valid judgment is binding in a second suit between the same parties as to the issues
decided in the first. F. JAMES, Cxvm P ocsnunn § 11.18 (1965). Where the cause of action and
the parties are the same in the second suit, the principles of res judicata apply to preclude
relitigation. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). Where the cause of action is
different but the issues are identical, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to those issues.
Id. at 353. See also lB J. MooRE, FED m PRArcTE .441-.444 (1974). Previous judicial
findings, however, are given great weight in subsequent decisions based on the doctrine of
comity or stare decisis, although the latter doctrine often has been limited to previous deci-
sions within the same jurisdiction. For a comprehensive listing of decisions illustrative of
those doctrines applied to patent law, see 5 JOHN MARSHALL J. oF PRAc. & PRoc. 356, 361
nn.24 & 25 (1972). See also Rollins, supra note 1, at 579.
3. The Supreme Court has discouraged disposition of infringement suits on the ground of
noninfringement alone because of the "greater public importance" of determining whether
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Outside the field of patent law, the doctrine of mutuality under-
went a period of evolutionary change4 marked by instances of con-
vulsive mutation in recent years.5 The espoused purposes of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel had been to minimize litigation where
a party has had a full and fair chance to present his case,' to prevent
that party from subjecting others to needless litigation,7 and to
induce general reliance on the finality of judicial pronouncements.8
Strict adherence to the mutuality requirement had created diamet-
rically opposite results, however; by requiring the participation of
both parties in the previous action before allowing decided issues to
prevail in later suits, the court-imposed mutuality doctrine allowed
repetitious and irksome suits to contradict earlier findings.' There-
fore, in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association,"° the California supreme court shifted the focus of the
second proceeding from the previous relationships of the parties to
the adequacy of the original adjudication." One result of the deci-
or not the patent is valid. Sinclair Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). See
also 60 GEo. L.J. 1126, 1127 (1972).
4. REsTATE ENT OF JuDMENTS §§ 96, 97, 99 (1942); Evans & Robins, The Demise of Mu.
tality in Collateral Estoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-So-Instant Replay),
24 OKLA. L. REv. 179, 183 (1971); Halpern, supra note 2, at 765-66; Note, The Impacts of
Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1010, 1015-17 (1967); Comment, supra note 1, at 209, 211. Exceptions "where the relation
between the defendants in the two suits has been that of principal and agent, master and
servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee" were recognized in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128 (1912). See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 34 U.S. 865 (1950).
5. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942). "[The 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter." B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d
141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971); Coca-Cola
Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 130-31, 172 A. 260, 262-63 (1934). See also Kahn,
Blonder-Tongue and the Shape of Future Patent Litigation, 53 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 581 (1971).
7. Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 808 (1942).
8. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25
Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962). See generally Halpern, supra note 2, at 764-65; Lieberman &
Nelson, In Rem Validity-A Two-Sided Coin, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 9,14-15 n.27 (1971); Note,
supra note 4, at 1013; Comment, supra note 1, at 211.
9. See generally Halpern, supra note 2, at 764-66; Comment, supra note 1, at 211.
10. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
11. "In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata [and collateral estoppel] three
questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the
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sion was to reduce repetitious litigation by allowing an issue once
decided against a party to stand in a subsequent suit by that party
against a person not a litigant in the first action.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation2 presented the United States Supreme Court in 1971
the opportunity to add impetus to the growing trend away from the
mutuality requirement.13 The Court requested that the litigants
argue the issue, although neither party had requested a direct over-
ruling" of the mutuality doctrine as applied to patent litigation in
Triplett v. Lowell,'" apparently deeming the patent relitigation situ-
ation an appropriate vehicle for discussion of the collateral estoppel
doctrine even if only in dicta.'6 Its disposition of Blonder-Tongue
partially overruled the absolute requirement of mutuality "... . to
the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of
infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid ' 17 and
remanded the case to allow a plea of estoppel.'5
Although furthering the goals of judicial economy inherent in the
doctrine of collateral estoppel,'9 the Blonder-Tongue decision raised
party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?" Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
12. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
13. The Supreme Court had not ruled on the doctrine of mutuality in patent cases for 35
years. See 402 U.S. at 325, 326 nn.13 & 14.
14. "Sua sponte, on its own, after having accepted this case on our petition for certiorari,
the Supreme Court asked us to address ourselves to two issues that the Supreme Court
dreamed up: (1) should the doctrine of Triplett v. Lowell, giving a patent holder more than
one bite of the pie against another defendant, be overruled? And (2) if so, what should be
the effect in this case?" Remarks of Robert H. Rines (counsel for the appellant in the Blonder-
Tongue trial), American Patent Law Association Meeting, Symposium on Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation-The Decision and its Implications,
1971 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N BuLL. 718, 722 (Oct. 21, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Symposium). The
issues upon which the parties had appealed were the validity of the patent, the proper test
of obviousness, and a lack of due process because of alleged abuses of discretion by the trial
court.
15. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
16. After discussing Bernhard and its progeny, the court noted: "Obviously, these muta-
tions in estoppel doctrine are not before us for wholesale approval or rejection. But at the
very least they counsel us to reexamine whether mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where
a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a federal court has declared it to
be invalid." 402 U.S. at 327 (footnotes omitted).
17. 402 U.S. at 350.
18. Id.
19. See Evans & Robins, supra note 4; Note, supra note 4. Blonder-Tongue has been
applied to abrogate the mutuality doctrine in areas other than patent litigation. See, e.g.,
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (1974) (antitrust); Stebbins v. Keystone
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many questions concerning its application to patent law2 and left
unanswered the questions posed by the Blonder-Tongue litigants in
their appeal to the Supreme Court. 21 This Note will analyze the
effect of the Blonder-Tongue holding on several series of patent
litigations, examine the sources of the prevailing judicial antipathy
for the patent system, and consider the desirability of currently
proposed legislative changes which may transform the patent vali-
dation system into a scheme more palatable judicially and more
equitable for all participants.
THE BLONDER-TONGUE DECISION
In March 1966, the University of Illinois Foundation2 brought
infringement suits against Winegard Company, in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, and against
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Iowa court was first
to reach a decision, holding the patent invalid on the grounds of
"obviousness." 2r Subsequently, the Illinois court, while acknowledg-
ing the Iowa decision, found the patent valid and held it infringed.u
In affirming the Illinois decision of patent validity and infringe-
ment, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the
Iowa holding had been affirmed during the interim by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 25 but evaluated the patent indepen-
Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (civil rights action); Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d
520 (2d Cir. 1973) (issue decided in criminal case precluded in a prisoner's civil rights claim);
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973) (suit to reform a
mortgage estops action for damages for fraud). But see Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041
(2d Cir. 1974) (limiting Blonder-Tongue to patent cases).
20. See notes 55-73 infra & accompanying text.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. The Foundation was the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 3,210,767 issued October 5, 1965
to Dwight E. Isbell. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 314 (1971). The Foundation had filed six other infringement actions based on the patent.
The patented item was a "frequency independent undirectional antenna" for color television
reception and was based on the design of the antenna. 402 U.S. at 314.
23. University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
The "obviousness" standard, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), was interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See notes 142-46 infra & accompanying text.
24. See 402 U.S. at 316 (discussing the unreported Illinois decision). See also University
of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970).
25. University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
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19741 PATENT VALIDATION
dently,2 1 relying upon the authority of Triplett v. Lowell.27 Faced
with directly contradictory decisions in the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 8 ap-
parently to settle the issue of the patent's validity.
Policy Considerations
Rather than addressing the substantive patent issues involved,
however, such as the validity of the foundation's patent and the
proper test of obviousness, 19 the Court requested the parties to argue
the procedural question of the desirability of continued adherence
to Triplett and the effect to be accorded to a previous finding of
patent invalidity if Triplett were not to be followed.30 Four policy
considerations led the Court to convert the controversy over the
validity of the patent into a consideration of the operation of collat-
26. University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.
1970). In the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Judge Lay, applying the test of non-
obviousness as espoused by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966), had stated: "The mere fact that the invention' was not previously known or developed
is not the test. Where logical exploration within known principles of the science achieves an
unpredictable result, even though a commercially desirable one, the burden of nonobvious-
ness is not necessarily overcome." University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 402 F.2d
125, 127 (8th Cir. 1968). In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Fairchild,
when presented with the same basic evidentiary sources, concluded: '
From the record before us, we do not view the situation as one where it was
obvious to antenna designers that a simple dipole and the segment of line
between it and the next dipole in an array would describe a cell fitting the
concept of logarithmically periodic antennas, nor that some arrangement of
simple dipoles in geometric progression would be a frequency independent
broadband antenna, making it simply a matter of logical experimentation to
find one.
With all respect to our brethren of the eighth circuit, who saw the problem at
the time of Isbell's work as."one of trial and error with a combination of com-
monly used elements operating within known principals of electronics and me-
chanics to achieve a desired result", we conclude, with the district judge here,
that the Isbell patent was not invalid for obviousness.
University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769, 775 (7th Cir.
1970).
27. 297 U.S. 638 (1936). See note I supra & accompanying text.
28. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 400 U.S. 864 (1970).
See also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 317
(1971). It has been noted that the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent cases and
seldom upholds the validity of the patents involved after granting certiorari. Comment, supra
note 1, at 207.
29. See note 14 supra.
30. 402 U.S. at 317.
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eral estoppel in patent litigation.3'
First the Court considered the previously permitted relitigations
in relation to the role of the judiciary in patent litigation generally.
Acknowledging the constitutional basis2 of patents and the es-
poused congressional policy of rewarding inventors by means of the
patent system,33 the Court noted that the function of the judiciary
in the patent scheme was to narrow, on a case-by-case basis, the
broad criteria for patentability established by the legislative branch
and applied by an office of the- executive branch." The Court as-
serted that, while patent litigation might require intricate and com-
plex determinations, the federal judiciary is as equally qualified to
decide patentability standards as to determine nonpatent issues
such as negligence and scienter. 5 Considering the trend of the law
away from the mutuality requirement in nonpatent areas and the
judiciary's capability to decide both patent and nonpatent issues,
the Court reasoned that a relitigation was not insurance that the
suit would be decided more accurately upon retrial." Therefore, the
Court decided that a procedural review of the initial invalidity-
validity determination was more appropriate than a subsequent de
novo determination.
A second policy consideration supporting the abrogation of the
mutuality doctrine concerned the economic impact of Triplett on
patent litigation." Noting the high cost of such litigation, the Court
argued that the resources expended on relitigation would be better
spent on research,3m and pointed out that the specter of litigation
31. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 219-24.
32. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "to promote the progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
33. 402 U.S. at 330-31.
34. Id. at 332.
35. Id. at 331.
36. Id. at 331-32.
37. See generally Halpern, supra note 2, at 774-75; Comment, supra note 1, at 221.
38. 402 U.S. at 338. Some estimate the cost of litigation at fifty thousand dollars per party
per suit. The significance of this high figure should be tempered by acknowledging the great
value of most patents, the average gain over the life of the patent having been estimated at
1.2 million dollars. See Rollins, supra note 1, at 562. It has also been argued that the cost to
an alleged infringer of defending by means of a factual examination of the first judicial
decision will be equivalent to the costs of a case involving a reexamination of validity. Note,
Blonder-Tongue: Abrogation of Mutuality Requirement for Defensive Use of Collateral Es-
toppel in Patent Infringement Suits, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 287, 296 (1971). Applications of
collateral estoppel by means of motions for summary judgment, however, negate the long
[Vol. 16:295
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expenses could cause manufacturers to accept licensing agree-
ments or prelitigation settlements in lieu of attempting to attack
specious patents in court.39 Thus, the Court concluded that contin-
uation of the mutuality requirement could no longer be justified in
light of the gravity of the resulting consequences.
Moreover, these economic- ramifications were particularly cogent
in light of the third policy consideration, the inherent monopolistic
nature of the patent privilege," which previously had caused limita-
tions to be imposed on attempts to extend such monopolies through
licensing agreements." Similar considerations had led the Court to
extend the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws to cover
patentees who knowingly obtained specious patents, 2 to allow de-
claratory judgment actions against patentees by manufacturers of
possibly infringing items,43 and to permit a licensee to litigate the
validity of the patent under which it was paying royalties4 Modifi-
evidentiary process required in a retrial of validity.
39. 402 U.S. at 338-42. These costs then are passed on to the public in the form of higher
prices for the manufactured goods. Evans & Robins, supra note 4, at 202; Comment, supra
note 1, at 222.
40. The historical antecedents of patents are the governmental grants of privileges and
monopolies to towns and guilds in fourteenth century England and later to foreign workmen
in England. Later monopolies in the form of the governmental charter grants for exploration
and colonization helped to develop the American colonies. F. VAUGHN, TH UzNrrE STATES
PATENT SYSTEM, 13-19 (1956).
Although the foundations of the patent law rest in these ancient monopolies, more recent
concepts of patents as property or as limited franchises have been advanced in light of the
"relevant market" definition of monopoly existing under current antitrust theory. Since the
patent is unique, there are no other competitors in its relevant market if the market is defined
in terms of the patent alone; the patent then becomes a natural monopoly not necessarily
condemned by the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp.
244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). If the relevant market is
defined more broadly, competition from other inventions within the area of the patented item
lessens any monopolistic effects of the patent. See note 162 infra & accompanying text. See
also Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 810, 814 (1971); Halpern,
Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion and Analysis, 54 J. PAT. OF. Soc'Y 5, 15-17 (1972) (Conclu-
sion).
41. See 402 U.S. at 343, 343 n.38, 344 n.40. See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
42. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 1 (1965). See also
Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a Unitary Theory, 35 GEO. WAs. L.
Rnv. 512 (1967).
43. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
44. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Before Lear a licensee had been estopped
from asserting invalidity after acquiescing to a licensing agreement. See 402 U.S. at 346-47
(economic analysis of the Lear decision). See also 40 FoRunIt L. RPv. 419, 424 (1971).
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cation of the Triplett mutuality requirement was a logical sequel to
these prior limitations upon the market power of the patentee.
Economy of effort for the judiciary was the fourth policy consider-
ation invoked by the Court. Although admitting that the actual
savings in court time to be gained by abrogating the mutuality
doctrine in patent invalidity cases probably would be de minimus,
the Court regarded any savings as beneficial.45 Considering the eco-
nomic consequences of the mutuality principle, the derogation of
the mutuality requirement in other areas of the law, and the Court's
own previous limitations upon the patent "monopoly,"46 it con-
cluded: "[Tihe uncritical acceptance of the principle of mutuality
of estoppel expressed in Triplett v. Lowell is out of place." 7
CRrrERIA UPON RELmGATION
Despite the attractive rationale of the Blonder-Tongue opinion,
an examination of the Court's criteria for permitting a plea of estop-
pel in subsequent litigation following an initial adjudication of a
patent's invalidity reveals two inherent problems: The first con-
cerns application of the criteria;" the second, and more fundamen-
tal, is the uncertainty created by an apparently negative judicial
attitude towards patents and by the inability of the judiciary to
formulate and apply properly standards of patentability.
In establishing its criteria, the Court did not formulate an estop-
pel doctrine that would approximate a sweeping in rem determi-
nation of a patent's invalidity, since, as one pre-Blonder-Tongue
commentator had warned, "Too broad an estoppel [would] enable
the patentee to evade the estoppel concept by piecemeal litiga-
tion."49 Rather than the narrow Bernhard "decided-issue test,",,
45. 402 U.S. at 348-49. See Rollins, supra note 1, at 569. It had been argued that litigation
might actually increase. Id. at 584-85. See also von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J.
299 (1929); 54 HARV. L. REv. 889 (1941); 23 ORE. L. REv. 273 (1944).
46. The Court also discussed a proposal to reduce patent relitigation by treating the initial
judicial determination of a patent's validity as an in rem, rather than in personam, decision.
402 U.S. at 339-42. See generally Woodward, Changes in the Patent System Recommended
by the President's Commission, 27 FED. B.J. 189 (1967).
47. 402 U.S. at 350.
48. "It may very well be that the laudable objectives of the Court toward reducing litiga-
tion and controlling the patent system will have been defeated by the vague guidelines
established for review of the prior adjudication." Note, supra note 38, at 294-95.
49. Rollins, supra note 1, at 572. A broad, insufficiently critical application of estoppel
could allow the patentee to assert that the validity of his patent had been approved judicially
against all claims when prior litigation may have considered carefully particular allegations
[Vol. 16:295
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which would allow the estoppel plea broadly once the second court
was satisfied merely that the controverted issue had been decided
by a prior court, the more inclusive Blonder-Tongue criteria also
require evaluation of the quality of the judicial decisionmaking pro-
cess through a less automatic "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
test to protect the patentee's interests from the acknowledged com-
plexities of patent litigation.51 To apply the full and fair opportunity
test, the Court's criteria focused upon whether the patentee had the
choice of forum in the prior litigation, his incentive to litigate at that
time, and whether the issue was obviousness, 52 in which case a sub-
set of criteria also was to be applied: whether the first court pur-
ported to apply the proper test of obviousness, whether the district
or reviewing court wholly failed to grasp the technical subject mat-
ter, and whether the patentee was deprived of witnesses or crucial
evidence without fault of his own." Rather than providing greater
specificity to facilitate the use of this formula, however, the Court
added a caveat: "But as so often is the case, no one set of facts, no
one collection of words or phrases will provide an automatic formula
for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will neces-
sarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity.""4
Thus the criteria which the Court established are not those of
.collateral estoppel because they could permit the issue of patent
validity, although once adjudicated, to be relitigated for a number
of reasons. Since the "sense of justice and equity" standard in the
Court's decision strongly qualifies the overall test to be applied
before allowing the estoppel plea, a more appropriate name for the
procedure to be utilized would be "equitable review" rather than
collateral estoppel.
Application of Criteria
Following the promulgation of the Blonder-Tongue criteria, ques-
only or the argument of the prior case may have been constrained artificially.
50. See note 11 supra & accompanying text.
51. 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971).
52. For an invention to be patentable, it must meet the statutory conditions of utility, 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1970), novelty, 85 U.S.C. § 102 (1970), and nonobviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1970). See generally Voorhees, A Summary of Patent Law for the General Practitioner, 20
DRAIKE L. REv. 227 (1971). For a further discussion of obviousness, see notes 142-50 infra &
accompanying text.
53. 402 U.S. at 333.
54. Id. at 333-34.
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tions arose concerning the judicial reaction15 to the vaguenss of the
criteria,5s the scope of the factual determination at the second trial,57
the degree of finality of the estopping decisions, 8 the lack of choice
of forum and incentive to litigate for the patentee caused by the
effect of a declaratory judgment" initiated by an alleged infringer,
the effect of adjudications of patent validity befor 6 and after" a
55. The attorney for the respondent in Blonder-Tongue described the test as being a de-
termination of whether the patentee in the first case had a fair trial, "evidentially, sub-
stantively and procedurally." Symposium, supra note 14, at 72 (emphasis supplied). "I look
upon this as sort of the ESP test, because I think that is what all of us are going to have to
have in the future in order to try and determine what the courts are going to do in a Blonder-
Tongue situation." Id. (emphasis supplied). For an illustration of problems in applying a "full
and fair" test in criminal law, see Williamson, Federal Habeas Corpus: Limitations on Suc-
cessive Applications from the Same Prisoner, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265 (1974).
56. Note, supra note 38, at 293.
57. Id. at 294; 60 GEo. L.J. 1126, 1134 (1972).
58. Kahn, supra note 6, at 582-83; Comment, supra note 1, at 231.
59. Comment, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation:
Mutuality of Estoppel-A Final Eulogy, 5 I-D. L.F. 208, 217 (1971); 60"Gno. L.J. 1126, 1136-
37 (1972). An alleged or possible infringer may seek a declaratory judgment to test the validity
of the patent and the possibility of his infringement. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201 (1970). See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Deering lIilliken,
Inc. v. Koratron Co., 293 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); National Hairdressers' & Cosmetolo-
gists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 3 F.R.D. 199 (D. Del. 1943). A justiciable controversy is prerequis-
ite, but a charge of patent infringement creates a justiciable controversy sufficient constitu-
tionally to allow adjudication of validity prior to an action being brought by the patentee.
Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlingtpn Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 253 (D. Del. 1970), aff'd, 448
F.2d 1328 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). By means of a declaratory judgment
action, an alleged infringer could impinge both the "incentive to litigate" and the "choice of
forum" aspects of the Blonder-Tongue relitigation test. See also Rollins, supra note 1, at 567.
60. It has been argued that should Blonder-Tongue redound to the legislating of in rem
invalidity, in rem validity should logically follow. Comment, supra note 59, at 220. See also
Woodward, supra note 46, at 220; Symposium, supra note 14, at 733.
The essential question, however, is what a defendant-licensee who loses the first infringe-
ment suit may do after a subsequent declaration of invalidity in a different action. Although
res judicata would bar a second action, such as a declaratory judgment action, continued
payments by the licensee to the patentee would be wasteful economically; economic waste
was one of the considerations that induced the Court to reverse Triplett. 50 Tn s L. REv.
559, 564-65 (1971).
61. Considering present judicial interpretations of Blonder-Tongue, a finding of validity
after an invalidity decision may never be reached. See notes 94-95 infra & accompanying text.
Should such an event take place, however, the principles of res judicata would bar the
patentee from relitigation of the issue in a court holding his patent invalid. See note 2 supra.
The result would have a severe economic effect for the second alleged infringer. Not only
would he be required to pay damages for past infringement, but he also would be forced to
enter a licensing agreement or risk further infringement actions (possibly a wise choice, in
the event of a subsequent holding of invalidity by a different court). The costs of these
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determination of invalidity, the feasibility and desirability of multi-
ple actions,62 and the extent to which a second court should examine
the first court's substantive findings regarding obviousness and the
obviousness subcriteria.63 Subsequent lower court rulings have re-
damages would then be passed on to the public in the form of increased prices, which would
be substantially higher than those the first alleged infringer, who won his suit, could charge.
Since the first alleged infringer most probably would be a competitor of the second, the latter
would be placed at a definite competitive disadvantage, possibly forcing him from the market
entirely. The only other course for the second infringer would be to appeal, but should the
case reach the Supreme Court, that Court, if it were to deny to the patentee the chance to
establish the validity of the patent, would thereby establish in rem invalidity. More likely,
the Court would deny certiorari, thus tacitly disregarding economic consequences analogous
to the economics on which it based its Blonder-Tongue decision.
62. The first major form of multiple action that has been suggested is the class action under
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pegram, Efforts to Reduce Duplicative
Patent Litigation: The Effect of Recent Procedural Changes, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc' 631 (1973);
Kahn, supra note 6, at 584; Comment, supra note 1, at 234. The prerequisites for a class action
are: numerosity of parties making joinder impracticable, questions of law or fact common to
all litigants, representative parties with typical claims, and representative parties which will
protect the class's interest. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1213-14 (1966). Additional requirements may be imposed: that
individual adjudications would risk inconsistent results or impair the class members' ability
to protect their interests, that appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief for the class as a
whole is available, and that a class action would be the superior form of adjudication due to
the predominance of common issues over individual issues. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b). See also
Cohn, supra; Pegram, supra. Since 1966 only four patent cases have been allowed to proceed
as class actions. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 714 (N.D. 11. 1968); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp.
497 (N.D. ll. 1969); Bouns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 348 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. I. 1971); Dale
Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971) (class action per-
mission later rescinded). Before Blonder-Tongue, a patentee in a class action risked a deci-
sion of invalidity against substantially all, if not all, alleged infringers. An invalidity decision
ordinarily would have been relitigated against a new defendant in a later suit. After the
Blonder-Tongue decision, such a risk is no longer a concern since any holding of invalidity
will now be asserted against the patentee in subsequent suits whether class or individual
actions. Therefore, the class action might appear attractive to the patentee to avoid numerous
suits in different locations. Strong arguments, however, have been made against the availabil-
ity of class actions in patent litigation due to the difficulty of defining a class of alleged
infringers, the commonality of only the issue of patent validity, and the problem of finding a
truly representative party to defend since most infringers would be competitors and therefore
could have conflicts of interest invalidating their representative character. Note, Class Ac-
tions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474.
Another type of action with a multiplicity of parties is consolidation for pretrial proceed-
ings. Such consolidation is effectuated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
which consists of seven circuit and district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970). The transfers are made by the panel to "promote
just and efficient conduct of such actions." Id. If, however, the decision of the first district
court on remand from the consolidation is that the patent is invalid and all the other courts
apply estoppel, the consolidation will have been needless effort.
63. See notes 137-39 infra & accompanying text.
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:295
solved certain issues in applying Blonder-Tongue, but it is question-
able whether the results have comported with the operation of an
equitable review beneficial to the overall patent system.
The Technograph Litigation64
In one series of litigation applying Blonder-Tongue estoppel, the
ideals of judicial and financial economy and reduction of excessive
and extortive litigation based on patents of doubtful validity appar-
ently have been attained. In the early 1960's Technograph Printed
Circuits, Ltd., initiated 74 actions against 80 manufacturers in 18
district courts and against the United States in the Court of
Claims, 5 later admitting that the first case was a "test case."
Despite an initial invalidation of Technograph's patent and lack of
success in efforts to reestablish its validity through appeal," Tech-
nograph instituted numerous actions- in other circuits" and later in
the same circuit." One action from which no appeal was taken was
64. See Appendix A infra.
65. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 484 F.2d 905 (7th
Cir. 1973).
66. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing of Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix
Aviation Corp., 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1964), aft'g 218 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1963). See discus-
sion of the admission in Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 474
F.2d 798, 804 (4th Cir. 1973); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Electronics
Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
67. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md.
1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964). The decision in this
case appears sound especially in light of the intracorporate correspondence cited in Techno-
graph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 484 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1973):
"Prior to the litigation, the president of Technograph Printed Electronics, an American
company, wrote to [Technograph] Printed Circuits, a British company: 'The Technograph
patents are inherently weak and at heart only form the legal basis for making a claim against
industry. Their real worth in America depends entirely [on] how strongly they can be backed
by both money, legal talent and influence. . . .We must litigate if we expect to extract
worthwhile sums from industry."' 484 F.2d at 906.
68. See Appendix A infra.
69. Id. The later suit in the Fourth Circuit was based on claims in the patent which were
not expressly invalidated in the Bendix case. Technograph Printed Circuits, Inc. v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 340 F. Supp. 423 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 880 (1973). The district court, however, decided that the claims invalidated in the
first suit sufficiently incorporated those made the basis for the second suit to warrant an
application of estoppel in the second suit. Id. An unanswered question in the Blonder-Tongue
decision concerned the effect of an invalidity holding based only on certain claims in the
patent as issued. Smith, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Prior Judgment of Patent In-
validity: Blonder-Tongue Revisited, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y 363, 367 (1973). The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit has allowed a second suit on claims not specifically invalidated
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terminated by an application of collateral estoppel without requir-
ing mutuality prior to Blonger-Tongue;7 after Blonder-Tongue,
further application of estoppel has terminated other litigation of the
admittedly "weak" patent.7'
Notwithstanding the apparent utility of the Blonder-Tongue
doctrine in the Technograph litigation, other applications have been
less successful. Generally, courts either have applied a more narrow,
less stringent test bordering on the Bernhard doctrine7 ? or have de-
in the first action where the court held the patent invalid based on explicit, enumerated
patent claims which were the basis of the plaintiff's suit. Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co.,
480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 726 (1973). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits, however, have held that where the defense of invalidity of the patent
was asserted in the first action and the court in the first action held the patent generally in-
valid, estoppel would be allowed to bar a subsequent suit on claims not invalidated specifi-
cally. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973); Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kan.), afl'd, 459 F.2d 482
(10th Cir. 1972). The Kansas district court relied on Judge Hoffman's treatment of the
plurality of claims issue in the remand decision of Blonder-Tongue (334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.
Ill. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972)). Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., supra at 858. Such reliance is suspect in light of
the later holding in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-
Bradley, Inc., supra. The Supreme Court refused the opportunity to settle the issue when it
denied certiorari.
70. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 290 F. Supp.
308 (C.D. Cal. 1968). After Technograph produced certain court-requested documents with-
out identification and in state of disarray, the court held that the plaintiff had flouted or
willfully disobeyed the court's orders. Combining such disobedience with other factors, in-
cluding the "test case" nature of the previous litigation, the court dismissed the action. Id.
at 320. The court also stated: "The doctrine of estoppel by judgmentis recognized where there
is not mutuality, in this Circuit, and where the previous judgment has gone against the
plaintiff who had ample opportunity to prepare, and to try his case, but who came forward
with no new or different evidence in the second case. . . ." Id. at 318, citing United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1961) (a plane-crash case in which the numerous
claimants invoked collateral estoppel to bar relitigations of the issue of negligence.
71. See Appendix A infra. The fact that the estopping decision occurred prior to Blonder-
Tongue has been held nondeterminative because the Supreme Court did not limit Blonder-
Tongue to prospective application and all of the Blonder-Tongue tests were deemed met,
including even that of Graham regarding obviousness, although Graham was decided three
years after the Bendix decision which was the basis for estoppel. See, e.g., Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 340 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Md. 1972). But
see Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 480 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion).
72. See note 11 supra & accompanying text. Narrowing the test, to issues specifically
decided for example, broadens the estoppel by not applying the qualifications and limitations
which the Supreme Court imposed in Blonder-Tongue. Broad application of estoppel through
a narrowed Blonder-Tongue test can deprive the patentee of the ability to reestablish the
validity of his patent in court. See notes 49-51 supra & accompanying text. In the remand of
Blonder-Tongue to the district court, Judge Hoffman noted the distinction between a normal
plea of collateral estoppel and such plea in a patent suit: "In patent litigation. . . the defense
of estoppel is not established by procedural fairness alone. There is a substantive element as
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moted the test to the "automatic formula" which the Supreme
Court attempted to avoid by infusing the "trial courts' sense of jus-
tice and equity" into the criteria for reevaluation.73
Blonder-Tongue on Remand
The first case to create difficulties was the Blonder-Tongue de-
cision itself on remand from the Supreme Court.74 There Judge
Hoffman apparently felt compelled by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to apply estoppel based on the- prior holding of invalidity in
University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co.75 despite his ear-
lier decision to the contrary; 76 consequently he failed to reach the
issues that would have allowed reinstating his previous validity
determination.
At the outset, Judge Hoffman did not delineate accurately which
Winegard decision provided the estoppel, the district court or the
appellate court decision. Since the Winegard case was decided on
appeal after the initial Blonder-Tongue validity decision, an appli-
cation of estoppel possibly would not have provided the patentee the
full and complete litigation to which he is entitled before estoppel
is invoked,77 and it is unclear whether the fairness of estoppel could
be determined where the possibility of a reversal of the estopping
decision existed at the appellate court level.78 Apparently Judge
well." University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 47, 50
(N.D. ill. 1971).
73. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 334
(1971).
74. University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.
Ill. 1971). The Supreme Court had vacated the affmation of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
75. 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968).
76. See University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 47
(N.D. Ill. 1971).
77. See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
78. Although Judge Hoffman did note that the appellate court had before it his previous
decision, he did not address the issue of finality of the estopping decision. 334 F. Supp. at
50. He also noted that plaintiffs argued that the courts of the Eighth Circuit wholly failed to
grasp the technical subject matter. Id. at 50. Thus the estoppel apparently was based on both
decisions. In cases outside patent law, the prevailing practice appears to be that res judicata
and collateral estoppel serve to preclude issue relitigation until a decision is actually reversed.
Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240 (1903); United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc., 318 F.2d 817 (2nd
Cir. 1943). See generally Smith, supra note 69, at 391-93. Such a practice in the patent field,
however, might create inequitable results, especially where a decision used as a basis for
estoppel was decided and not fully appealed before Blonder-Tongue was decided. In its denial
of a rehearing of a case contemporaneous to the Blonder-Tongue decision, the Court of
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Hoffman assumed that since the Supreme Court had had before it
the issue of the finality of the estopping decision but did not address
it directly, he likewise did not need to consider the question. 79 His
assumption, however, was unjustified since neither party had raised
the issue of finality in argument before the Court and indeed the
remand to the district court was for the specific purpose of examin-
ing such considerations. 0 Had the district court more fully deliber-
ated the finality question, its sense of justice and equity might have
allowed a relitigation of the issue of the validity of the patent.
The "obviousness" facet of the Blonder-Tongue test provides a
second problem area apparent in the district court decision. The
problem arose because Judge Hoffman failed to differentiate pro-
perly between the subtests to be used where the determination of
patent invalidity is based on obviousness. He quoted the Supreme
Court's estoppel test,' but by substituting an "and" 2 for the semi-
colon used by the Supreme Court, he made the three subtestss
conjunctive instead of disjunctive, thereby making the "failure to
grasp the technical subject matter" subtest an essential element to
be established before refusing to allow the estoppel plea. That dis-
tortion becomes highly significant in light of Judge Hoffman's con-
clusion that "[iut would demand arrogance" to assert that the
courts of the Eighth Circuit had failed to grasp the subject matter
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted: "Had the [patentees] been aware of the impending
partial abrogation of the mutuality requirement and the possibility that the judgment ad-
verse to them in the (previous] litigation might be asserted against them by other alleged
infringers not parties to that action, they would undoubtedly have been more diligent in
prosecuting their appeal from that judgment." Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 444 F.2d
210, 217 (7th Cir. 1971). The fairness of applying estoppel by means of a decision not fully
appealed was raised more directly in Sampson v. Ampex Corp., 478 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1973),
in which the district court decision providing the basis for estoppel first was appealed, then
the appeal abandoned by the parties after they reached a settlement concerning the patent
in question and eight other patents. Id. at 340. The district court denied a motion to vacate
the invalidity judgment and was upheld on appeal. Sampson v. RCA, 434 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1970). Applying estoppel in the Ampex decision, the court of appeals carefully examined the
district court's earlier decision rather than applying estoppel automatically. 478 F.2d at 341.
79. 334 F. Supp. at 51. "All these circumstances were before the Supreme Court, and with
this record before it that Court directed that defendant be given an opportunity in this Court
to raise the defense. This Court cannot evade the mandate by holding that such factors defeat
the plea." Id.
80. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971).
81. Id. at 333.
82. 334 F. Supp. at 50.
83. See notes 52-53 supra & accompanying text.
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merely because the court weighing the estoppel plea disagreed with
the validity determination. 4 When the two tests are applied con-
junctively, it would demand arrogance to relitigate the validity of
the patent merely because a different conclusion might be reached.
Had Judge Hoffman, however, disentangled the three subtests of
obviousness, the resolution of the case could have been more consis-
tent with the equitable review or qualified estoppel test promul-
gated by the Supreme Court. Because Judge Stephenson clearly
comprehended fully the subject matter in the Winegard case,85 the
second subcriteria of the Blonder-Tongue test was satisfied. Also,
since the evidence presented in each case was substantially the
same,85 the third criteria of unavailable evidence would have been
inconsequential. In weighing the evidence, however, Judge Stephen-
son had declared the design of the Isbell patent a mere combination
of known elements of prior art, concluding that even though the
combination was an improvement over the prior art, ". . . the 'in-
vention' does not rise to the level of patentability . . . ." Accord-
ingly, it would not have been unreasonable for Judge Hoffman to
have concluded that the test of obviousness used by the Winegard
court was actually the "invention" test which Congress had modi-
fied legislatively" and which the Supreme Court has attempted to
qualify in Graham v. John Deere Co. 9 Although Judge Stephenson
purported to use the standard espoused in Graham, he did not
consider the secondary considerations which were established in
Graham."0 Those secondary considerations include "commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.""1 It can
84. 334 F. Supp. at 50.
85. University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
Judge Stephenson's elaborate discussion of frequency independent unidirectional antennas,
which included illustrative drawings from the original patent claims, displayed a thorough
understanding of the subject matter. See id.
86. The essential items of evidence discussed were the prior patents in the area and an
article published several years prior to the issuance of the Isbell patent. See University of
Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1971); University of Illinois
Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769, 774 n.11 (7th Cir. 1970).
87. University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412, 419 (S.D. Iowa
1967).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
89. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
90. Id. at 17-18.
91. Id. at 17. The Court did not clarify the weight to be given to such considerations, but
qualified their use since some are not relevant to all discoveries. For example, a long felt
demand would be inapplicable to a completely new discovery in a new field. For a discussion
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be inferred from the decision in the court of appeals that Judge
Hoffraan had found the patent nonobvious in his initial decision92
because of the secondary considerations of failure of others to
discover the invention and the commercial success of the patent.
From the failure of the Winegard court to apply the complete
Graham test, Judge Hoffman could have concluded that his sense
of justice and equity would have been affronted by not relitigating
the issue of the validity of the patent, despite his unwillingness to
charge Judge Stephenson with a failure to grasp the technical sub-
ject matter.
Thus the Blonder-Tongue decision on remand could have resulted
in the relitigation of the patent's validity on the basis of "justice and
equity" applied to either the finality issue or the obviousness issue.
Since the previous determination of validity probably would have
been reiterated, any subsequent appeal to higher courts would have
been made on those specific issues. A clarification of the estoppel
issue would have been helpful, and a clearer delineation of the ob-
viousness issue would have reached the root of the original dispute. 3
Absent a thorough reexamination of the first invalidity decision,
the issues for the second court are limited to determining whether
the validity of the patent was an issue in the first decision, whether
there was a final judgment on the merits of the patent," and
whether the issue of validity was decided against the patentee-
essentially no more than the Bernhard tests,95 which were discussed
in Blonder-Tongue by the Supreme Court but rejected in favor of a
more qualified estoppel test.
On appeal Judge Hoffman's second decision was challenged on
the basis that he had misapplied the Graham standards." In its per
curiam decision the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
"Review by the court which considers the plea of collateral estoppel
of the applicability of such considerations, see Note, Subtests of 'Nonobviousness" A Non-
technical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1169 (1964), referenced by the
Court in Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
92. See University of Ilinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th
Cir. 1970).
93. Obviousness was the basic issue upon which the case originally was appealed. See notes
14, 26 supra.
94. Traditionally there is no allowance for a pending appeal when applying collateral
estoppel. See note 78 supra.
95. See notes 10, 11 supra.
96. University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 465 F.2d 380, 381 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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of the reasoning of the court which made the prior adjudication
would be inconsistent with the doctrine of collateral estoppel.""7
Such a review is not inconsistent with the requirements of Blonder-
Tongue, however. Since the Supreme Court created an equitable
review, rather than a true collateral estoppel, the court of appeals
decision appears to sidestep the considerations which the Supreme
Court took great pains to establish. The court of appeals attempted
to buttress its argument by citing other recent decisions,"5 but those
decisions were based on the erroneous application of the Supreme
Court's test by Judge Hoffman." Rather than interrupt this circular
contraction of its equitable review test, however, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari ' perhaps because of its previously expressed de-
sire to reduce extended patent litigation.
The Blumcraft Litigation
The failure of the Supreme Court to examine applications of
Blonder-Tongue has resulted in the anticipated termination of liti-
gation, but the reduction in litigation may have been coupled with
a concomitant diminishing of "justice and equity." Litigation in-
volving Blumcraft of Pittsburgh,'1 a partnership which owned a
handrail design patent,1 2 provides one unfavorable illustration of
the application of Blonder-Tongue. The first decision, in the United
States Court of Claims, concluded that the patent was valid and
infringed," 3 based upon the findings of a commissioner who utilized
the Graham obviousness standard including the secondary consider-
ations.' 4 Although there was no detailed analysis of the obviousness
standard by the commissioner, he concluded that the patent passed
97. Id. at 381.
98. Id. at 381 n.3, citing Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 348 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. 111.
1972), partially rev'd, 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973), and Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architec-
tural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 459 F.2d 482 (10th
Cir. 1972).
99. See notes 74-93 supra & accompanying text.
100. 409 U.S. 1061 (1972).
101. See Appendix B infra.
102. U.S. Patent No. D-171,963, issued April 20, 1954. The statute establishing design
patents states: "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
103. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. United States, 372 F.2d 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
104. Id. See also notes 89-91 supra & accompanying text.
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"the accepted tests for patentability."'1 5
The second decision in the series came in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Carolina in Blumcraft of Pitts-
burgh v. Citizens & Southern National Bank."'5 Without citing.
Graham specificall:3, the district court determined the patent to be
valid because not obvious I0 and fortified its conclusion with the
secondary consideration that the patent was successful commer-
cially.' The court also held a separate mechanical patent' ° valid
and found that both patents had been infringed.110
When the defendant appealed, a three-judge panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously decided that the
patents were obvious and reversed the lower court findings.' Citing
the Graham test, the court concluded that the prior art was too
similar to the patent to survive the requirement of nonobviousness
to one skilled in the art at the time of the design.112 The court added
to its obviousness inquiry the secondary tests of Graham and con-
cluded that any long felt need -or commercial success which Blum-
105. 372 F.2d at 1018. The government's counsel did not contest the issue of liability for
patent infingement, apparently assuming that the validity was beyond denial. Id. at 1015.
106. 286 F. Supp. 448 (D.S.C. 1968). This action was filed prior to the action in the Court
of Claims. See Appendix B infra.
107. "Recognizing that it was not new to provide an offsetting handrail from the supporting
structures, nevertheless, it was new to offset all the rails in this particular manner so as to
minimize the connection between the railings and the posts, thus giving the floating effect."
286 F. Supp. at 456. The court also relied heavily on the testimony of the defendants' expert
who had said that the design was unusual and not one he would have designed. Id. The court
also stressed that a hindsight view was improper to test obviousness. Id. at 455.
108. Blumcraft had contended that the validity holding in the Court of Claims made the
issue of patent validity res judicata. The court noted:
[We] need not decide whether the Court of Claims case is res judicata as to
the validity although such decision was persuasive, for this court has reached
its own independent determination that plaintiff's design patent is valid.
The presumption of validity, the prior judicial determination and the com-
merical success achieved by the plaintiff overcome any doubt as to the validity
of the design patent. Inasmuch as defendants have failed to sustain their burden
of proving that the design would have been obvious at the time it was made to
one having ordinary skil in the art, or that there was a prior use, the court finds
the design patent valid.
286 F. Supp. at 456.57 (footnotes and citations omitted).
109. U.S. Patent No. 2,905,445. The patent was based on handrail connectors for a different
ornamental rail structure.
110. 286 F. Supp. at 466-67.
111. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 407 F.2d 557 (4th Cir.
1969).
112. Id. at 559.
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craft had attained was due to the prefabrication of the railings
rather than the patented design.113 While preceding its analysis with
an admission of novelty and the distinctive floating effect created
by design, the court stated that novelty alone would not suffice
without an act of invention."4 Although the decision thus appeared
to be premised upon a hindsight observation of obviousness based
partially on the "invention" standard supposedly displaced by Con-
gress," -5 the Supreme Court refused either to resolve the conflict
between the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Court
of Claims or to take the opportunity to clarify the Graham stan-
dards."'
At that point the stage was set for application of Blonder-Tongue.
Following the second validity holding, Blumcraft filed an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against
Architectural Art Manufacturing Co., the manufacturer of the in-
fringing railings involved in the first two actions. '" 7 Blonder-Tongue
113. Id. at 559-60. The court made an independent, de novo evaluation of prior art.
114. The court stated: "We agree with [the United States Court of Claims] and with the
district court that Blum's design was novel because the prior art did not disclose multiple
rails offset from posts by inconspicuous connectors presenting the illusion of the rails floating
in space." Id. at 558. The court then noted that more than novelty was required, citing a 1951
decision: "[Tihere must be an exercise of the inventive faculty, and if the design lacks this
quality, it will not suffice to say that it is new, original and ornamental, and has recieved
wide public acceptance." Glen Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, 189 F.2d 845,
851 (4th Cir. 1951). Glen Raven, however, was decided prior to the more objective standard
Congress attempted to establish in 1952.35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). A comparison of the illustra-
tion of the patent in that decision shows that there was prior art in the form of varying
designs, but a new heel design in hosiery led to commercial success.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). Although section 171 requires that a design patent meet all
conditions for patentability, see notes 52 & 102 supra, the Graham standard of obviousness
destroys the validity of any design patent if applied as it was in the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The court stated: "It is apparent from the sophistication of the prior art that
designers of ornamental railings, including manufacturers and architects, were highly skilled.
Therefore, the fact, which the district court emphasized, that prior art would have to be
redesigned to achieve Blum's railing is not decisive. The joining of known components usually
requires skill, but this does not necessarily negate obviousness.." 407 F.2d at 559. According
to such reasoning, any ornamental design by an architect or engineer or designer would be
unpatentable because it necessarily would be based on a combination of known components
and made by an individual possessed of ordinary skill in the art.
116. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 395 U.S. 961 (denying
certiorari), 396 U.S. 870 (denying petition for rehearing), 396 U.S. 949 (1969) (denying motion
for leave to file second petition for rehearing).
117. See Appendix B infra. See also Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg.,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kan. 1972). Blumcraft originally moved for summary judgment
on the basis that Architectural Art had been a party to the previous actions upholding the
patent and the issue of validity therefore was barred by res judicata. After the Court of
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having been decided while the action was pending,"" the court then
allowed the defendant to plead collateral estoppel and granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment."' Since an issue of res
judicata had been raised previously by the plaintiff based on the
defendant's involvement in the previous decisions, 120 the court based
its decision on both res judicata and collateral estoppeL
In its application of collateral estoppel, the court acknowledged
the decisions of validity but stated that the decision in Blonder-
Tongue at the Supreme Court level and on remand showed that
Blonder-Tongue "applies only to judgments of invalidity - not to
judgments of validity. 1 21 While the Supreme Court did not discuss
the offensive use of collateral estoppel based on patent validity, it
did qualify its collateral estoppel test with the admonition to the
trial courts to use their "sense of justice and equity" before applying
estoppel.r The Kansas district court overlooked this caveat and
applied a combination of res judicata and collateral estoppel by
means of an automatic, mechanical formulation of these doc-
trines. ' Furthermore, the court made only a cursory review of the
Graham obviousness standards.124 After the Patent Office and two
judicial forums had held the design nonobvious and patentable, a
"sense of justice and equity" should require a more intensive and
comprehensive analysis of the issue of obviousness before utilizing
collateral estoppel.rs Nevertheless, the decision of the Kansas dis-
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the patent invalid, the parties switched positions on the
res judicata issue. See Appendix B infra. See also Smith, supra note 69.
118. See Appendix B infra.
119. 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Han. 1972).
120. See note 117 supra.
121. 337 F. Supp. at 858. The district court premised its contention upon a case in which
use of the Blonder-Tongue estoppel theory was denied to a patentee attempting to avoid a
relitigation of validity by asserting a previous holding of validity as estopping such relitiga-
tion, BouteU v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1971). Boutell was distinguished by the Georgia
district court in Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
by noting that the Supreme Court's Blonder-Tongue decision concerned a situation in which
the first decision regarding a patent held it invalid and that an equitable form of estoppel
should be applied in a second suit. Id. at 1024. Thus collateral estoppel would not automati-
cally apply in the fourth suit after the first and second suits held the patent valid prior to an
invalidity decision in the third suit.
122. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
123. See 337 F. Supp. at 859.
124. "One of the principal issues urged by defendants in that suit was obviousness. Perusal
of the opinions of both District Judge Simmons and Circuit Judge Butzner indicate[s] a
familiarity with and application of the standards announced in Graham v. John Deere...
to the evidence in the case." 337 F. Supp. at 858 (emphasis supplied).
125. The actual wording of the test established by Justice White's opinion was "whether
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:295
trict court was affirmed without further analysis. 126
In Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co.,'2 another line of cases
involving the Blum patent, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia at first held that Blonder-Tongue re-
quired an equitable application of estoppel. Inasmuch as the action
was filed after the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had found
the patent invalid, the Georgia court displayed a strong disinclina-
tion for allowing relitigation of the validity of a patent once held
invalid. 28 Although calling for an abrogation of the mutuality re-
quirement by the Supreme Court or Congress, the court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment 29 in continued reliance
on Triplett. While the case was pending, however, Triplett was
overruled, and the district court had the opportunity to apply collat-
eral estoppel based on the invalidity holding of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in accordance with Blonder-Tongue."' It re-
fused, however, because of the conflicting validity decisions, 3 argu-
ing that the "justice and equity" qualification in Blonder-Tongue
prohibited an automatic application of estoppel based on a decision
of patent invalidity where there were previous holdings of validity."2
the first validity determination purported to employ the standards announced in Graham v.
John Deere Co. . . ." Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 333 (1971) (emphasis supplied). The use of the word "purported" implies that a
mere "perusal" may be sufficient without close analysis to satisfy the Court's test. Since the
other subtests established for appropriate inquiry, a failure to grasp the subject matter and
a deprivation of evidence, require an in-depth examination of the record of the previous
decision or decisions, more than a mere perusal for an indication of "purported" use would
appear necessary to meet the equitable requirement of Blonder-Tongue. See also Smith, The
Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Prior Judgment of Patent Invalidity: Blonder-Tongue
Revisited, 55 J. PAT. Or. SoC'Y 436, 438-42 (1973).
126. Blumraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam).
127. 341 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
128. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 318 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ga. 1970). See also
Appendix B infra.
129. 318 F. Supp. at 1401.
130. See Appendix B infra.
131. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
132. "To blindly adhere to the plain language of Blonder-Tongue and automatically apply
an estoppel when the patent has once been held invalid, would be unjust and inequitable.
Such a strict application of the estoppel doctrine would bar a patent, which has been sus-
tained numerous times, from any further litigation, simply because it was finally declared
invalid." Id. at 1020. The court went on to note that estoppel could be applied if warranted:
"On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to think that the Supreme Court, in Blonder-
Tongue, intended to limit the application of estoppel only to situations where the patent was
declared invalid the first time it was litigated. Such a narrow application would pretermit
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On a motion for rehearing, the court rejected the argument that
the Blonder-Tongue remand decisions had narrowed the "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" test.s Holding that the factual distinc-
tion, the prior holding of validity, evoked a different resolution, the
court asserted that a consideration of the equities would not allow
collateral issues, such as availability of evidence or utilization of
prior art, to lend greater weight to one decision over another.'34 It
thus concluded that a conflicting decision regarding a patent's va-
lidity could bring about a relitigation and reexamination of patent
validity in a later action. After the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed '3 the Kansas district court decision, however, the
Georgia district court waivered, hesitantly granting a renewed mo-
tion for summary judgment.'36
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the "sense of justice and e4uity" test was lim-
ited strictly to determining whether a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the patent's validity was available to the patentee in a find-
ing of invalidity only.In Because review only of the invalidity deci-
sion when the same patent had been upheld previously would not
be a truly equitable review, the Supreme Court could not have
intended such a limited reconsideration. Nevertheless, the appellate
court further concluded that in determining whether to apply estop-
pel, district courts could not be concerned with the correctness of
the prior decision since "the Supreme Court applied estoppel with-
out regard to the 'correctness' of the first decision." 3' In fact, the
Supreme Court made no such application, but. merely remanded the
case for a possible application of estoppel in accordance with the
the policy reasoning behind the estoppel doctrne...... [A] patentee, whose patent has been
held valid only once and held invalid numerous times thereafter, should be estopped from
bringing additional suits." Id. at 1020-21.
133. Id. at 1022.
134. Id. at 1024.
135. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1972).
136. The final grant of summary judgment for the defendant by the district court is unre-
ported but is discussed in the appellate affirmation. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co.,
482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973). The court quoted from the district court's order: "'While the
court is not fully convinced that its analysis of Blonder-Tongue, . . . as set out in the
November and March orders, was incorrect, it must and does give precedential consideration
to the above holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as it applies to the issue of
collateral estoppel in this case.'" Id. at 546.
137. Id. at 547.
138. Id. at 548.
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standards it established. Since those standards included a substan-
tive review of the invalidity decision as well as the procedural and
evidentiary aspects of the former decision, Blonder-Tongue did not
make irrelevant the correctness of the previous decisions in a deci-
sion to apply estoppel. 3
Accordingly, the Kansas and Georgia district courts should have
reviewed more fully both the decisions of validity and the invalidat-
ing decision. In examining the invalidity decision, both courts could
have reached the question of the propriety of the de novo finding of
obviousness by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."' Al-
though such review of an appellate decision might appear presump-
tuous for district courts, it seems mandated by the Supreme Court
decision in Blonder-Tongue, inasmuch as the doctrine actually es-
tablished more closely resembles "equitable review of validity deter-
minations" rather than the doctrine of collateral estoppel. More-
over, to be just and equitable, the previous validity decisions should
have been weighed in determining whether to apply estoppel. Either
balancing the previous holdings of validity against those of invalid-
ity or examining the validity decisions by Blonder-Tongue stand-
ards would be a more equitable method of approaching the previous
validity determinations.
Finally, the district courts also should have reached the issue of
whether Blonder-Tongue should be applied retrospectively. Since
all the cases filed in the Blumcraft series were filed prior to Blonder-
139. Although de novo examination should not be required, the review should be as exten-
sive as that normally accorded to a trial court decision by an appellate court. Blumcraft had
argued in the district court in Georgia that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
committed reversible error by not adhering to the trial court's factual determinations. Blum-
craft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Judge Hender-
son responded that the issue "is not an issue to be properly raised in this court. The Supreme
Court in Blonder-Tongue required that the patentee-plaintiff be permitted to demonstrate
that he did not have a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue
his claim the first time. This mandate of the Supreme Court does not extend so far as to give
this court authority to sit as an appellate court to determine if-the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit committed reversible error because it allegedly ignored certain findings of fact
made by the lower court." Id. at 1020. On the contrary, it is submitted that such a review is
exactly what the Supreme Court did mandate in Blonder-Tongue.
140. In a recent decision the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court
decision on obviousness based on a de novo determination by the appellate court over a strong
dissent on that issue. Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 489 F.2d 231 (4th
Cir. 1973) (Winter, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court refused to settle the issue when a
similar argument was made in a petition for certiorari. Parker-Sweeper Co. v. E.T. Rugg Co.,
474 F.2d 950 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
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Tongue, it could be argued that the choice of forum and incentive
to litigate could not have been considered fully by the patentee since
knowing the grave consequences of a decision of invalidity on future
decisions or on intended litigation could have affected greatly his
strategy or willingness to litigate.'41 Absent an analysis of such is-
sues, the application of collateral estoppel becomes an automatic
formula devoid of the equitable considerations which the Supreme
Court attempted to create.
EFFECT op BLONDER-TONGUE APPLICATIONS
The foregoing series of cases illustrate the defects of the judicially
created standard for applying collateral estoppel to the patent sys-
tem. In its creation, the standard left many questions unresolved;
in its application by the lower courts, the standard has not served
to focus its unresolved issues sufficiently to allow more precise defi-
nition through appellate review. Its overall effect upon the patent
system still cannot be determined, but as the Blumcraft litigation
demonstrates, no "equitable review" has resulted, the courts apply-
ing instead a mechanical collateral estoppel devoid of justice and
equity which precludes judicial clarification of unresolved substan-
tive issues. One unfortunate effect has been a continued uncertainty
regarding the judicial standard of obviousness. Because of the appli-
cations of estoppel, the varying determinations of obviousness have
not been evaluated sufficiently to provide reliable guidelines for
patentees, alleged infringers, or courts.
Although the Supreme Court purported to establish a definitive
test of obviousness in Graham v. John Deere Co.,1 42 its own applica-
tion of those standards has been suspect, leading one commentator
to note that the Court subsequently appeared to revive the discred-
ited "invention" requirement in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
141. See note 78 supra. See also Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir.
1973), in which Judge Pell dissented on the issue of retrospective application. He noted
that in the Supreme Court "[t]he issue simply was not reached.... When new law is
established or, more importantly, when existing law is changed, it always is retrospective as
to the particular litigant who is unsuccessful. This is inherent, for courts do not customarily
give advisory opinions. This is a far cry though from inferring that the decision is retrospective
as to other litigants who were relying on the pre-existing law." Id. at 129. Such an argument
would seem to be especially relevant where the new law is to be applied on the basis of the
trial courts' "sense of justice and equity."
142. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See note 146 infra.
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Pavement Salvage Co.14 For many years, the judicial tests of pat-
entability concerned whether a new development possessed a qual-
ity of invention.144 Because the invention standard, however, proved
inadequate to predict judicial reaction to a patent's validity, Con-
gress attempted to make determinations of validity more objective
by recognizing that while any innovation was an invention, patenta-
ble inventions were only those not obvious to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the prior art."' In Graham the Court construed the
legislative test to require a determination of the scope and content
of prior art and an evaluation of nontechnical secondary considera-
tions. "I Nevertheless, in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. the Court pur-
ported to utilize the standard of Graham, but gave little weight to
the secondary aspects of that test;14 in fact the Court quoted from
a pre-Graham case stating that those considerations "without in-
vention will not make patentability." '
Although the Court reemphasized reliance on the Graham stan-
dards in Blonder-Tongue, the test of obviousness appears to be suf-
fering from a judicial inability or unwillingness to formulate and use
objective standards of patentability. Since the decision in Blonder-
143. 396 U.S. 57 (1969). See Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of Patentability - The
Old Tests of Invention, 39 GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 123 (1971).
144. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950);
Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107
U.S. 192 (1882); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). See also Note, supra note 143, at 135.
146. In Graham the Court stated:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this back-
ground, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia
of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.
383 U.S. at 17-18.
147. See Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
148. Id., quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147,153 (1950). Although the Court noted in Graham that the congressional intent in enacting
section 103 was merely "a codification of judicial precedents" with further inquiries into the
subject matter, 383 U.S. at 17, the tests established in Graham, especially the secondary
considerations, tend to establish an objective test for obviousness unlike the "flash of genius"
or "invention" test used prior to, and occasionally after, the enactment of section 103. See
Note, supra note 143, at 140. See also Harris, Some Aspects Underlying Legislative Intent of
the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 658 (1955); Comment, Obviousness in the
Eighth Circuit, 14 ST. Louis L.J. 672 (1970).
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Tongue, it has been recognized that the determination of validit
or invalidity in any litigation is extremely important to future litiga-
tion.' To ensure fairness, the initial determination of obviousness
should depend upon standards uniformly applied in all courts mak-
ing such determinations. It has been argued that a full and fair
determination of validity is impossible in a court which does not
correctly apply obvioisness standards.'
Presently, however, a patent holder is placed in an untenable
position. Although he possesses a patent duly issued and validated
by the Patent Office, he must jeopardize his patent through litiga-
tion to protect it from infringement. His patent will be judged on
the basis of uncertain standards, and his chances of a full and fair
adjudication may be slight, depending upon the prevailing judicial
attitude towards patents. " ' Since the same unclear standards will
be applied on review, the appeal from a decision of invalidity may
not be any more helpful to the patentee than the initial trial. More-
over, since the patent's validity now probably will not be relitigated
in another jurisdiction due to the automatic applications of
Blonder-Tongue estoppel, the first holding of invalidity effectively
resembles an in rem decision. 152 A patentee therefore takes a great
risk in any suit to enforce his rights under the patent. Consequently,
one effect of Blonder-Tongue may be curtailment of any patent
infringement litigation.
Additionally and perhaps more importantly, the manner in which
Blonder-Tongue has been applied may stimulate legislative action.
When case-by-case development of an area of the law has failed to
149. In Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. National Tank Co., 445 F.2d 922, 926 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1971), the appellate court reversed a lower court summary judgment of invalidity, noting
the importance of full determination of factual issues in the initial trial of a patent's validity
in light of Blonder-Tongue.
150. Kahn, supra note 6. '"To maintain that a patent holder has a full and fair chance to
litigate his claim in a circuit which repeatedly applies the improper test for obviousness is
truly a pipedream, and the Supreme Court's failure to recognize and rectify this situation
makes the Blonder-Tongue decision oppressive." Id. at 217. See also Halpern, supra note 40.
151. See notes 154-55 infra & accompanying text.
152. The patent would be invalid against all the world (in rem invalidity) except to the
extent of prior holdings of validity. Licensing agreements reached prior to the invalidity
decision would remain enforceable against parties involved in previous litigation where the
patent was held valid with the anomalous result that the patent's validity would be res
judicata between those parties. See Woodward, supra note 46, at 220; Statement of Walter
E. Wyss, Symposium, supra note 14, at 733 ("Let's face it, we have in rem invalidity.");
Comment, supra note 1 (noting that legislative adoption of in rem invalidity should be
followed by serious consideration of in rem validity).
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promote justice and equity or announced policy goals, efforts to
reform the entire area frequently center in the legislative branch of
the government.' The inability or unwillingness of the judiciary to
apply properly the equitable review established in Blonder-Tongue
is intertwined with the problems of defining and applying obvious-
ness and other standards of patentability. Thus the establishment
of an inadequately analyzed and improperly applied judicial
standard, incorporating another standard also subject to varying
applications, creates uncertainty and confusion for patent system
users and should provoke legislative reaction.
ELIMINATION OF THE SOURCES OF JUDICIAL ANTIPATHY TOWARDS THE
PATENT SYSTEM
Formulating possible legislative solutions to the problems created
by Blonder-Tongue and its progeny first requires recognition of the
attitudes which have shaped previous judicial responses to patent
law problems. Commentators, and an occasional court, have ac-
knowledged the judiciary's disaffection for the patent system,154
often noting that some jurisdictions find a disproportionately high
or low percentage of patents invalid.155 The disparate validity-
invalidity ratios tend to substantiate the claim that some courts are
more strict in defining patentability than are other circuits and the
Patent Office. The Blonder-Tongue decision itself indicates the
Supreme Court's anxiety that the owners of "weak" patents will
153. For a discussion of the rise of administrative agencies due to the inability of case-by-
case adjudications by the courts to carry out policies, see J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISmATE
PRocess (1938).
154. See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand &
Frank, JJ., concurring). Voorhees, supra note 52, at 241; Symposium, supra note 14; Com-
ment, supra note 1. Cf. Horn & Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different
View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y 134 (1973).
155. Rollins, supra note 1, at 565; Comment, supra note 1, at 227. Cf. Horn & Epstein,
supra note 154, at 146. One patent law practitioner has stated: "Those of us who make our
living litigating patents have recognized for a long time that choice of forum is one of the
facts of life that we have to live with and that a choice of forum may very well control the
result in a given case." Remarks of William K. Kerr, Symposium, supra note 14, at 748. The
Supreme Court indirectly took notice of this fact by establishing the choice of forum as one
of its criteria inthe Blonder-Tongue test. See notes 52-54 supra & accompanying text. One
recent case was appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit applied too low a standard of patentability; the Court, however, did not take
the opportunity to comment on the standards to be applied. Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark
Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla.), af/'d mem., 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 94 S. Ct. 66 (1973).
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derive possibly unjust benefits therefrom. Before legislative alterna-
tives can be proposed to remedy the inconsistencies and inequities
generated by Blonder-Tongue, the sources of the judicial distrust of
the patent system must be confronted.
Patents as Monopolies
Much of the judicial disaffection for the patent system stems from
conceptualizing the patent as a monopoly.15 Since monopolies tra-
ditionally have been deemed antagonistic to the competitive eco-
nomic process, characterizing a grant of patent rights as a monopoly
imputes to the patent undesirable economic ramifications. Follow-
ing this reasoning Congress could merely concur in the monopolistic
characterization of patents, determine that such monopolies no
longer have a place in our highly technological and rapidly changing
society, and abolish the patent system entirely. Since there is no
common law patent right, and since the patent system is a statutory
creation, no legal obstacles prohibit such abolition.117
The purposes of the patent system as generally formulated, how-
ever, are to promote invention, to reward the inventor, and to en-
courage public disclosure of new discoveries. 1 8 Were the system to
be abolished completely, the human inclination to be creative prob-
ably would assure the survival of the process of invention' because
the satisfaction or the necessity of the invention would suffice to
reward the inventor; new discoveries, however, could become well-
guarded secrets, particularly if they imparted to the inventor a com-
petitive trade advantage.' Thus for the purpose of expanding the
available technological advances, the patent system serves a func-
156. See note 40 supra.
157. "Congress having created the monopoly, may put such limitations upon it as it
pleases." Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1899). Such limitations
could include complete abolition. The Constitution gives Congress the power to establish the
Patent Offic6, but does not mandate its existence. See note 32 supra.
158. Reward of inventors, disclosure of invention, development of invention, and public
welfare have been posed as arguments for patents. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 27-33. The
Supreme Court often has emphasized, however, that the primary purpose of the patent
system is the "advancement of the arts and sciences" and "not the reward of the individual."
"Its inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial
to society." Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 331 (1944).
159. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 1-12.
160. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 28. Such a result is even more likely in light of Kewanee
Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held thatfederal
patent law does not preempt state trade secret laws.
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tion too valuable to be withdrawn.16'
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to adopt a knee-jerk characteri-
zation of patents as monopolies. The term "monopoly" has been
redefined under antitrust law in terms of competition within a rele-
vant market; a patent grant that is still subject to competition from
other inventions in the field is not a strict monopoly. 6 2 It also is
logically compatible with the function of a patent to characterize
the patent right as a limited franchise16 or even as a contract
right.6 4'
Corporate Nature of Patentholders
Some judicial antipathy for the patent system may stem from the
fact that many patent holders are not individual inventors, but are
instead business corporations."5 Little opposition may be voiced to
rewarding an individual who devises a better mousetrap in his ga-
rage workshop in his spare time; more diverse responses are evoked
by the image of a corporate research and development laboratory,
however, where technicians are paid to make new discoveries to be
assigned to the company and used for corporate economic gain.
While critics should not begrudge a company recovery of its research
costs, the use of patents by corporations to enforce licensing agree-
ments against other corporate entities as a means of economic gain
appears to arouse antimonopolistic attitudes.' 6
Fundamental changes in the patent process would be required to
161. It has been noted that universal.recognition of patent systems exists worldwide, even
in the Soviet Union. See Voorhees, supra note 52, at 242.
162. Fortas, supra note 40, at 814. See also note 40 supra.
163. Fortas, supra note 40, at 814; Kennedy, supra note 42, at 514. See also Picard v.
United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 638 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring).
164. Under the contractual theory, an inventor receives exclusive monetary rewards for his
invention as consideration for the disclosure of his invention. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at
27.
165. Such an adverse response to the corporate nature of many patentees was illustrated
in the Blonder-Tongue discussion of the economic effects of repetitious litigation. See
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See also
Kennedy, supra note 42, at 515; Hearings on S. 1321 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 119-
21 (1973) (statement of Edward J. Brenner, former Commissioner of the Patent Office) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings].
166. One commentator has written: "The accumulation of the vast patent portfolios by
corporate assignees based upon research performed by its individual inventor-employees may
.. . provide an undeserved cloak of immunity for predatory preclusive practices amounting
to antitrust misuse." Kennedy, supra note 42, at 533-34.
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remove whatever distortion the presence of corporate patent holders
introduces. One method would be to make patents nonassignable,
allowing only the inventor himself to arrange licensing agree-
ments,' 7 to prevent an impersonal organization, not necessarily re-
sponsible for the actual discovery, from benefiting from prostituted
ingenuity. Such an approach, however, ignores the fact that most
research and invention is performed in organizational laboratories
whose continued existence depends upon the economic benefits
which they accrue for the parent industries. Furthermore, this ap-
proach too easily assumes that individual inventors would possess
the capability to enforce licensing agreements through litigation.
Another change in the patent system which could remove ill feel-
ing toward corporate patent holders would be to make a governmen-
tal cash award to the inventor in lieu of granting a patent.'68 Such
an award could be a one-time grant, virtually eliminating any need
for litigation. Consumers presently underwrite the licensing costs of
any patent utilized by a manufacturer as a cost of production passed
on to the retail sale; a more equitable distribution of these costs
might be achieved if the individual supported the inventive process
in his role as a taxpayer, rather than as a consumer. The recovery
of research cost would be a component of the grant as would be a
stipend sufficient to encourage further invention.'6 ' The problems of
value determinations, however, could render such a method impos-
sible,' and a failure of the stipend to appear sufficiently rewarding
could destroy completely the incentive to disclose inventions.
Complexities in Patent Law
The complexity, both of the technical subject matter of many
patents and of the field of patent law itself, 7' constitutes a third
167. Another method of counteracting accumulation of patents by corporations would be
to require the patentee to license to anyone who desired to make use of the patent. Arnold &
Janicke, Compulsory Licensing Anyone?, 55 J. PAT, On. Soc'y 149 (1973).
168. Cash rewards for invention are not novel; to overcome various crises, Napoleon used
this method to acquire inventions, including a method for deriving sugar from beets. F.
VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 4-5.
169. The government already funds much of the research and development in the areas of
national defense and public health. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 314-15.
170. "The value of a patent is ultimately determined by the marketplace, and is generally
difficult to judge from reading the application." Hearings, supra note 165, at 172 (testimony
of Karl E. Bakke, General Counsel, United States Dept. of Commerce).
171. "The patent system is strang'and weird territory to most judges." Fortes, supra note
40, at 810. "[The patent system] is also an island harboring a family of specialists who have
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source of judicial disaffinity for patents; courts occasionally have
admitted defeat in their attempts to comprehend the technical as-
pects of the cases before them. 172 While the Supreme Court in
Blonder-Tongue asserted that issues in patent cases are no more
difficult than those involved in determinations of negligence and
scienter, it nevertheless included in the Blonder-Tongue test the
determination whether the judge in the first adjudication wholly
failed to grasp the subject matter.173 Technological considerations
aside, the fact that few judges sitting on patent cases have signifi-
cant experience in the litigation of patent claims '71 can generate
inconsistent applications of the relevant legal standards for adjudi-
cation.
To counteract the reconditeness of patent litigation and the judi-
cial antipathy it stimulates, the legislative establishment of special-
ized courts performing all patent litigation is a feasible alterna-
tive.171 Specialized courts designed to deal with various problems
have long been a part of our juridical heritage;17 for example, the
Tax Court has been said to deal "with a subject that is highly
specialized and so complex as to be the despair of judges." '177 Al-
developed folkways that have only a generic relationship to the rest of the nation." Id. at 815.
172. See Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir. 1965), in which the court
noted: "IThis case presents great difficulties to judges like ourselves who have only the most
elementary training in science and mathematics and little experience with modem technolog-
ical developments." The court further stated: "We frankly admit that we cannot read [the
plaintiff's patents] intelligently.. . . Moreover, we have great difficulty in understanding,
even in a general way, the technical testimony of the experts and the discussion of that
testimony by counsel orally and in their briefs. However, we must do the best we can." Id.
at 533-34. It has been noted that the resulting "judicial hunch" method of decisionmaking
creates inconsistent holdings which prevent prelitigation assessment of infringement allega-
tions. Note, supra note 91, at 1170.
173. See notes 51-54 supra & accompanying text. The Court in Blonder-Tongue stated that
failures to grasp the subject matter were "relatively rare instances." 402 U.S. at 333. Deter-
mining when such an event occurs will be difficult because it would appear that judicial pride
would prevent most admissions of such inability and judicial fraternity might preclude at-
tacks on another's ability. See note 84 supra & accompanying text. Also, the mere quotation
from the patent application could give any opinion an appearance of understanding which
would be difficult to rebut.
174. See Fortas, supra note 40, at 815. The relative inexperience of the judge is emphasized
in contrast by the fact that the attorneys in a case may be quite experienced in the patent
law specialty.
175. Brenner, The Challenges to the Patent Systems in the 1970's, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
407, 418 (1971). It has been noted that there are more than 500 federal district and appellate
judges trying patent cases. Rollins, supra note 1, at 590-91.
176. See Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM.
& MARY L. Ray. 473, 475 n.8 (1973).
177. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943).
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though the overall economic and political aspects of patent law may
not approach the ramifications of tax law, the patent field is undeni-
ably complex and equally specialized."'
A court for infringement and other patent actions also would be
justified because of the expertise that could be developed within a
patent court judiciary. Staffing the court from the patent bar would
assure understanding of the patent system among the judiciary.
Another byproduct of a patent court, a more consistent application
of pertinent standards, would minimize the effects of decisions that
have cited, but distorted, the Blonder-Tongue and Graham hold-
ings. A uniform application of obviousness criteria could be ex-
pected. Moreover, rather than extending Blonder-Tongue to im-
pute as in rem effect to a finding of patent invalidity by the patent
court, the court could apply a more traditional notion of collateral
estoppel to preserve justice and equity by utilizing the Bernhard
standards of finality of judgment and identity of issue and of parties
to determine whether validity should be relitigated.1 19 Although the
court could apply equitable considerations to the evidentiary as-
pects of the prior litigation, the suggested approach would mitigate
concern over the substantive and procedural aspects of the previous
litigation. In effect the expertise and uniformity of standards of a
patent court would remove the need for a Blonder-Tongue equitable
review doctrine.
A special court for patent litigation, however, appears to be an
unlikely legislative choice for several reasons. First, the federal
courts have long been the traditional battleground for patent litiga-
tion, and as a means of developing judicial expertise, some consider-
ation in assigning cases appears to be given to those judges specifi-
cally qualified or interested in the field of patent law,"'0 somewhat
obviating the need for specialized development of patent law judges.
Furthermore, procedural and evidentiary aspects of a patent trial
178. Since the scope of patent courts could be narrowly defined, their establishment would
not present the problems of political, administrative, and judicial interface which have been
raised by proposals for an environmental court system. See generally Whitney, supra note
176. The American Bar Association has endorsed a proposal for the establishment of an
intermediate level appellate court called the National Division of the United States Court of
Appeals with jurisdiction between that of the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court and
possibly exclusive jurisdiction over tax and patent cases. The Washington Post, Feb. 6,1974,
§ A, at 2, col. 1.
179. See notes 10 & 11 supra & accompanying text.
180. See Remarks of Moderator Graves, Symposium, supra note 14, at 763-64. See also
Rollins, supra note 1, at 591.
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are no different from those a federal judge normally confronts. Fur-
thermore, when choosing between a major alteration in the present
system, such as the creation of a new court, and modification of the
existing structure, a legislative body is perhaps more likely to choose
the latter.'" Blonder-Tongue and its kin, therefore, may affect
patent legislation primarily by stimulating improvements in the
operating procedures of the Patent Office.
Decisionmaking in the Patenting Process
A fourth consideration shaping judicial attitudes towards patents
concerns the decisionmaking process used to award patents.8 2 Pat-
ent Office procedure calls for the applicant's request to be reviewed
by an examiner who serves as both adversary and adjudicator,1' the
adversary function being provided by the examiner's search to de-
termine factually that the invention does not duplicate a similar
item previously patented. After his examination of prior patents,
the examiner makes an adjudicatory finding of patentability. This
dual role of the examiner is one aspect of the patenting process that
invites judicial concern;' another is that the secrecy of the ex parte
proceeding may invite misrepresentation on the part of the patent
seeker. '8
181. In a review of proposals for changes in administrative agency procedures, including
the establishment of administrative courts, one commentator has asserted that, where possi-
ble, the more provident method of curing defects is to alter existing agencies instead of
creating new ones. Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to
Mr. Hector, 69 YALu L.J. 965 (1960).
182. Fortas, supra note 40, at 815. See generally F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 25.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1970). It has been stated that the Patent Office regards the procedure
as one in which the examiner is strictly an adversary. Fortas, supra note 40, at 816. Certain
proceedings in the application process clearly are adversary in nature; for example, when two
potential patentees dispute the priority of invention for the same discovery, "interference"
proceedings are held to resolve the dispute. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1970). The number of interfer-
ence proceedings traditionally has been very small. F. VAUGHN, supra note 40, at 24.
184. Similar duality of roles in administrative agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board
has evoked sharp criticism. See Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regula-
tory Commissions, 69 Yan L.J. 931 (1960). Hector severely criticizes the Board's authority
over the conflicting functions of the adjudication, administration, policymaking, investiga-
tion and industry development, arguing that lessened credibility is inevitable when adjudica-
tions are subject to ex parte influence. Similar arguments can be applied to the Patent Office
since the examiners make physical searches for prior art, then make factual determinations
of a basically adjudicatory nature based on their own searches and the urging of the patent
applicant in a secret proceeding.
185. See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 529.
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Direct and indirect emphasis on the quantity, rather than quality,
of patent evaluations by the Patent Office is another source of
judicial dissatisfaction with Patent Office procedures. Because the
number of patent applications has risen and forecasts predict a
continuing geometric increase,' s the number of applications alone
necessitates a certain emphasis on quantity; additionally, the pro-
motion possibilities of examiners are determined partially by their
ability to process a large volume of applications.'1 Inasmuch as this
inevitable emphasis on quantity may lessen the time spent on each
application searching prior patents in its field, it can result in a
Patent Office standard of patentability which may be less rigorous
than that applied by the courts. Because of the increased scrutiny
given to a patent in a truly adversary adjudication and because of
the judiciary's expressed desire to limit specious patents, courts
interpret strictly the patent criteria.1 8
A further aspect of Patent Office procedure that can be offensive
to the courts is the one-sided procedure used to contest examiner
decisions.8 9 Should a potential patentee be denied his application,
he can appeal the denial within the Patent Office' and to the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals. 9' If, however, the patent is issued
upon the first examination, no appeal can be taken on behalf of the
Government to further the public interest in the elimination of
specious patents. 2 The appellate process thus is designed to accom-
modate individual patent seekers who are dissatisfied by the nonis-
186. See Brenner, supra note 175, at 410.
187. Hearings, supra note 165, at 445-46 (testimony of Mr. Weissman, primary examiner,
Patent Office); id. at 89 (statement of Edward S. Irons, attorney, Washington, D.C.). Cf.
Horn & Epstein, supra note 154, at 139. See also Brenner, supra note 175, at 417.
188. A presentation of relevant prior art not considered by the Patent Office during the
original application process in a subsequent trial will "vitiate" or "dissipate" the statutory
presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970). See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Tel-Design,
Inc., 460 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1972); Westwood Chem., Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
445 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Rubber
Latex Prods., Inc., 400 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1968). Some practitioners have resisted modification
of the examination system because of the accustomed reliance on the possibility of citing prior
art not originally considered to invalidate adverse patents in litigation. Woodward, supra note
46, at 213.
189. See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 523.
190. A rejected application will be reviewed first by the Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C. § 134
(1970).
191. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
192. The Commissioner of Patents may only invalidate a patent if it is ruled invalid in a
subsequent interference proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1970).
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suance of a patent, whereas the reevaluation of patents issued
against the public interest is not made by an appellate review of the
Patent Office proceeding, but left to the courts in subsequent litiga-
tion of licensing agreements or alleged infringement. 3
To reduce judicial disaffinity for patent litigation and to accom-
modate the patent system to cases like Blonder-Tongue, legislative
reform of the patent system most likely will be directed to the deci-
sionmaking process within the Patent Office. The basic procedures
established in 1836 have undergone only minor alterations.'94 Since
that time, the number of patent applications has increased substan-
tially, and the sheer volume of prior art that must be searched to
determine patentability has mushroomed.15
Moreover, since the 1830's the "fourth branch" of government,
the administrative branch, has become a viable arm of the govern-
mental process," 6 the independent administrative agency, with leg-
islative and adjudicatory functions, becoming an accepted means
by which Congress has delegated the day-to-day operation of var-
ious programs and the factual determination of controverted is-
sues. 97 Inasmuch as administrative agencies have adjudicated li-
cense applications successfully in such fields as transportation,
communications, and aviation, a legislative attempt to adapt the
patenting procedure to a similar adjudicatory process is not an un-
reasonable expectation. 8
Attempts to reorganize the Patent Office along the lines of other
193. See Horn & Epstein, supra note 154.
194. See Woodward, supra note 46. See also President's Message to Congress on Sept. 27,
1973, regarding enactment of the Patent Modernization & Reform Act of 1973, 119 CONG. REC.
H8381 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1973).
195. One estimate based on a Patent Office study has predicted that the number of patent
publications in the 1970's will double the number of prior art references created in the last
150 years. Brenner, supra note 175, at 410.
196. See J. LaiS, supra note 153.
197. Professor Landis argued that the inefficiency of the legislative and judicial branches
in regulating the industrializing economy led to the creation of governmental agencies. J.
LmDis, supra note 153. He also traced the course of judicial rhetoric that originally opposed
the delegation of legislative functions to and usurpation of judicial functions by administra-
tive agencies but that finally acknowledged and used as justification the expedience of such
delegations so long as "roving commissions" were not created. Id.
198. The administrative process has suffered when legislative standards have lacked clarity
and uncertain judicial rationales have created the likelihood of unpredictable determinations.
H. FRIENDLY, TDo FEDERAL ADmaNsmTAmv AGENCIES (1962). The agencies, however, have
served as the means for accomplishing tasks too ministerial for Congress and too polidy-
determinative for the judiciary to undertake on a case-by-case basis. I'd.
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administrative agencies have been under way for some time.99 The
proposals would leave the Patent Office within the Department of
Commerce but stress independent exercise of discretion concerning
the rulemaking, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions of the
Patent Office.29" The paramount objective of the proposals is the
creation of an administrative agency determination within the pres-
ent Patent Office that would strengthen the patenting process, 2"'
provide a mechanism for ensuring high standards of patentability,0 2
and thereby establish a true presumption of validity for any patent
issued from the Patent Office.2 13
In differing degrees, the present proposals attempt to withdraw
from the examiner the duty of advocating the public interest. To
strengthen the adversary nature of the proceeding while allowing a
more truly adjudicatory role to the examiner, a separate officer,
called the "Solicitor," would serve as an official defender of the
public interest in a patent application proceeding.2 4 The proceeding
199. Since 1966 the following bills to revise the patent laws have been introduced into the
Senate without enactment: S. 1042, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); S. 2597, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1967); S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 1246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S.
2576, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st
Seas. (1973) thereinafter cited as S. 1321]; S. 2504, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973) [hereinafter
cited as S. 2504]; S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bills presently under consideration
include the following: S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975) (introduced by Senator McClellan)
[hereinafter cited as S. 23]; S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Senator Fong)
(hereinafter cited as S. 214]; S. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Senator
Hart) [hereinafter cited as S. 473].
There appears to have been strong reaction by the patent bar against S. 2504 and especially
S. 1321, both introduced in the 93d Congress. See 121 CONG. Rc. S387 (daily ed. Jan. 17,
1975) (remarks of Senator Fong). Senator McClellan also has expressed doubt that S. 2504
would have promoted the objectives of the reform initiated by the 1966 Report on the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent Office and therefore has submitted his own bill to effectuate
those changes. 121 CoNG. REc. S413 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1975) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
Senator Hart, whose bill, S. 1321, met strong opposition, also has resubmitted a bill to
maintain some of the changes he sought by the earlier bill. The Fong bill attempts to mini-
mize statutory changes to minimize functional changes; the McClellan and Hart bills, how-
ever, would make major alterations through total revision of the patent laws. Further propos-
als possibly incorporating portions of past bills not included in present proposals, see note
213 infra, may be forthcoming.
200. S. 23, § 1; S. 214, § 1. The Hart bill also would apply the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970), to Patent Office proceedings.
201. See President's Message to Congress on Sept. 27, 1973, regarding enactment of the
Patent Modernization & Reform Act of 1973,119 CONG. REc. H8381 (daily ed. Sept. 27,1973).
202. See Rollins, supra note 1, at 571.
203. The presumption is presently very easy to rebut. See note 188 supra.
204. S. 1321, the previous Hart bill, had designated this officer the "Public Counsel" and
had given him discretionary authority to intervene in any proceeding. Under the current Hart
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itself would then become a true adversary proceeding between op-
posing factions with the examiner serving as the "presiding officer"
and impartial arbiter.
The special officer also would be responsible for defending, and
possibly initiating, appeals on behalf of the public interest.2 11 Initial
review would be to a board within the Patent Office,2 1 with further
review of any decision being taken to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. 207 While this procedure is presently available to the
patent applicant,2 5 no appeal is now available for an advocate of the
public interest. Since the proposed proceedings would result in an
adjudication before the primary examiner where the solicitor had
participated, or before the Board of Appeals, the solicitor may desire
further appeal if a patent were to be granted over his objection. An
appeal of the validity decision, when upheld by a board of appeals
and an independent adjudicatory body, would tend to establish a
presumption of validity that would be difficult to rebut in any fu-
and McClellan proposals, the solicitor would intervene only upon request of the primary
examiner or the Board of Examiners-in-Chief (a separate creation of those bills, similar to
the present Board of Appeals which would be maintained under the Fong bill). S.23, §
3(d)(1); S. 473, § 3(d)(1).
205. While clearly stated in the Hart bill, S. 473, §§ 3(d)(2), 134(a)(1), this function is not
entirely clear in the McClellan bill. Under section 3(d)(2) of the McClellan bill, the officer is
mandated to "defend appeals." Under section 3(d)(3), upon becoming a party the officer has
all the rights and powers afforded parties, which include, under section 141, the appeal of a
final decision of the Patent Office to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Under section
134, however, only an "applicant" may appeal a decision of a primary examiner to the Board
of Examiners-in-Chief. S. 23, § 134. Thus, under the McClellan bill, the solicitor apparently
would have to be a party to the proceeding in the Patent Office to initiate an appeal and,
even then, could only appeal decisions of the Board of Examiners-in-Chief. Since access to
"party" status would be limited, and since decisions by primary examiners would stand even
though the solicitor was a party and disagreed, problems of appeals on behalf of the public
interest could arise.
206. The McClellan and Hart proposals would expand the present Board of Appeals, 35
U.S.C. § 7 (1970), to 60 members, renaming it the Board of Examiners-in-Chief. S. 23, § 5;
S. 473, § 5. Members of the Board would hear appeals from decisions of primary examiners
as interpartes proceedings and determine patentability de novo or remand for a new determi-
nation by the primary examiner. S. 23, § 134; S. 473, § 134. The action of the Board of
Examiners-in-Chief would constitute final agency action from which further appeal would
proceed outside the Patent Office. S. 23, § 5(d); S. 473, § 5(d).
207. S. 23, § 141; S. 214, § 141; S. 473, § 141. Review by civil action, however, also would
be available in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under section
145 of each proposed bill. The McClellan bill would limit appeals of priority contests to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. S. 23, § 141(b).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
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ture infringement litigation.09 In subsequent infringement litiga-
tion, the issue of patent validity would be established substantially
and only a cursory review would be necessary.210 The presumption
could become even stronger were review of the board of appeals
decision limited to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 211
establishing it as a specialized court for validity-invalidity determi-
nations. Although it partially serves that function already, its re-
view presently is limited to reconsidering the denial of a patent
application. If established as the validity reviewer, as well, it also
could consider revocation of a patent if its approval were to be
appealed by the solicitor.
With the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals legislatively es-
tablifhed as a specialized court to determine and apply patentabil-
ity standards, it could draw its members from the patent bar, and
its continual adjudication of patent matters would facilitate the
development of the requisite technological expertise. Its decision
still would be subject to review by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and Supreme Court. While this pro-
209. The proposed bills make no major alteration or augmentation to the statutory pre-
sumption of validity (35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970)). The proposed sections do add procedural
requirements to infringement suits so as to notify the opposingparties of the specific infringe-
ment or any material to be relied upon to invalidate the patent. S. 23, § 282; S. 473, § 282.
See also S. 214, § 282(c). The basic provision remains: "A patent shall be presumed valid."
S. 23, § 282(a); S. 214, § 282(a); S. 473, § 282(a).
210. Once the proposed procedures for review were established within the Patent Office,
an additional step could be taken to eliminate judicial determinations of validity. If substan-
tial evidence were raised in a subsequent infringement suit so as to cast doubt on a Patent
Office decision not fully appealed or opposed by the public counsel, the validity determina-
tion could be referred to the Patent Office foi board review. Such a procedure would be
available under the Fong bill, which would allow any person, presumably including a judge,
to request reexamination of a patent at any time after issuance of the patent. S. 214, § 313.
The McClellan and Hart proposals provide limited reexamination proceedings. See note 214
infra & accompanying text. It has been argued that only "weak" patents need further litiga-
tion to establish their validity. Horn & Epstein, supra note 154. Revised Patent Office proce-
dures should eliminate weak patents prior to their issuance, but, should the weakness become
apparent only after the initial adjudication, a second look by the Patent Office could clarify
the issue for the trial court (perhaps terminating the suit through invalidation or settlement)
and could strengthen further the role of the Patent Office as the patent validity forum.
211. The McClellan bill restricts review with respect to any priority of invention proceeding
to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. S. 23, § 141(b). Within certain time limits any
other appeal could be transferred to, or taken initially in, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia under either the McClellan bill or the Hart bill. S. 23, § 141(a);
S. 473, § 141. Under the Fong bill, any initiation of proceedings at the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals is a waiver of the right to a civil action in the district court. S. 214, § § 141(a),
145.
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posed expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals falls short of establishing a specialized court for all
patent matters, it could provide at least some of the benefits of a
specialized court.2 12
Further proposed modifications of Patent Office procedure to
allow reexamination would protect other parties, who, although not
directly involved with a patent application, might have potentially
adverse interests.213 Current proposals provide a grace period after
the granting of the patent during which any individual could submit
additional information and request further examination. 24 In addi-
tion, in proceedings before a board of appeals, the board members
would be empowered to issue subpoenas or other orders to provide
discovery upon application by any party to the proceeding, includ-
ing the solicitor '.2 5 The proposals also direct the Commissioner of
212. See notes 175-81 supra.
213. Under section 122(a) of S. 1321, the previous Hart bill, all pending applications would
have been made public, with certain national security exceptions. S. 1321, §§ 122(a), 122(b),
181. Section 137 provided: "Any party may at any time participate or intervene in any
proceeding arising pursuant to this title, or initiate, participate, or intervene in any appeal
therefrom, and thereby shall become a party of record." These proposals were opposed for
several reasons. First, the lack of secrecy would have allowed foreign competitors to patent
the items in their countries since international agreements to prevent such occurrences would
not come into effect until the grant of the United States patent. Hearings, supra note 165, at
76 (statement of William E. Schuyler, Jr., on behalf of American Bar Association). Addition-
ally, the lack of secrecy would have denied the inventor the opportunity to withdraw his
application. Id. at 79-80. Another criticism of increased public participation was that it might
have exposed the applicant "to harrassment with extensive discovery and full blown inter-
partes proceedings." Id. at 71 (testimony of C. Marshall Dann, President, American Patent
Law Association). Nevertheless, adversary proceedings at the pre-issuance stage possibly
could provide the highest degree of reliability for the patent validation process where a "full
blown interpartes proceeding" had taken place.
214. The McClellan bill would allow any person to bring to attention "matters which may
have a bearing on the validity of any claim of the patent" for a period of 12 months after
issuance of the patent. S. 23, § 135(a)(1)(A). After a response by the patentholder, the
solicitor would review the matter and recommend to the Board of Examiners-in-Chief
whether to hold an opposition proceeding. S. 23, § 135(a)(1)(C). The individual seeking the
reexamination then would become a party to the proceeding. S. 23, § 135(a)(2)(A). The Hart
bill would allow reexamination only for a six-month period after issuance with review by a
primary examiner. S. 473, § 135(a). The party requesting the reexamination would not partic-
ipate or be required to be identified, but he could appeal the primary examiner's decision
only if he were identified. S. 473, § 135(b)(3). These proposals would maintain the advantages
of secrecy in the application proceeding and reduce potential harrassment, but also maintain
an opportunity for members of the public to produce relevant prior art before being affected
adversely by the patent.
215. S. 23, § 23(a); S. 473, § 23(a). The McClellan bill would require a showing of good
cause. The Hart bill would require a good cause showing only in reexamination proceedings
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Patents to establish rules for discovery consonant with those in the
federal courts. 26 .In effect, the patent reexamination proceeding
could become a true adjudicatory hearing.
The most cogent argument against an adversary proceeding is
that the increased time and expense of the hearing might discourage
the disclosure of inventions through the patenting process.217 Cur-
rent proposals, however, would obviate partially the need for adjudi-
cations on every application by creating an obligation for applicants
to act with candor and good faith toward the Patent Office, to make
a reasonable inquiry into information within their control, and to
disclose all information which would prevent their application from
being misleading.218 Enforcement of these duties2 9 should prevent
certain specious patents, such as those in the Technograph litiga-
tion,2se from ever reaching the application stage. Prospective appli-
cants and their representatives would be less tempted to push
"weak" patents through the Patent Office if they could be held
and would allow subpoenas ex parte for the solicitor and parties to interference or priority
proceedings. The Fong bill would require issuance through a federal district court. S. 214, §
24. It has been noted: "Every federal agency except the Patent Office that is charged with
the duty of adjudicating applications for special licenses of franchises has, by rule or statute
or both, subpoena power to compel relevant testimony and document submission. . . .[The
Patent Office] lacks even the power to compel patent applicants to disgorge all relevant facts
of which they may be possessed." Hearings, supra note 165, at 89 (statement of Edward S.
Irons, attorney, Washington, D.C.).
216. S. 23, § 23(b)(1); S. 473, § 23(b)(1); S. 214, § 24(a).
217. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 165, at 71 (statement of C. Marshall Dann, President,
American Patent Law Association).
218. S. 23, §§ 115(a)(1), (2); S. 214, § 115(a). The Hart bill would make the obligation a
"continuing uncompromising duty to act with the highest degree of candor and good faith
... ." S. 473, § !15(a)(1). In addition these proposals would require a verification by the
inventor that he "believes himself to be the original and first inventor . . . ." S. 23, §
115(b)(2); S. 214, § 115(a); S. 473, § 115(b)(1). All three proposals create a duty for the
applicant and his agents to notify thePatent Office of any change in any information submit-
ted until the time the patent is issued. S. 23, § 115(a)(3); S. 214, § 115(d); S. 473, § 115(a)(3).
219. The Hart bill would create criminal penalties for violation of the duty to disclose by
making willful failure to disclose to the Patent Office a separate crime. S. 473, § 34.
220. See note 66 supra & accompanying text. The current legislative proposals effectively
would eliminate patents which although valid are not economically productive by requiring
payment of maintenance fees during the life of the patent; if payments are discontinued, the
patent terminates. Thus an economically unproductive patent would lapse when its owner
failed to pay maintenance fees as they came due. S. 23, § 41(f); S. 214, § 43; S. 473, § 41(f).
Maintenance fees have been criticized as burdensome to a patentee whose patent takes time
to realize commercial success. See Hearings, supra note 165, at 175 (testimony of Karl E.
Bakke, General Counsel, United States Dept. of Commerce).
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criminally responsible for such actions.22
Participation by the solicitor only upon request of the examiners
involved also will expedite the application process. 22 The applica-
tion process thus should be fully adversary only when substantial
issues of patentability are raised. Although appeals of negative de-
terminations and reexaminations also would be interpartes, the
added time and expense is justifiable to preclude frivolous appeals
in the former situation and to ventilate adequately the issues con-
tested in both types of proceedings.21
Restructuring the patenting process should encourage more favor-
able judicial treatment of patents. At a minimum, the pending
legislation should establish a system which will enable a court, in a
subsequent infringement suit, to review the patent in much the
same manner as it would review any administrative agency action.m
Where a full appeal was taken and the validity determination sur-
vived the increased scrutiny on agency review, a conclusive pre-
sumption of validity could result. In litigation involving only an
examiner's finding, a court could employ the familiar "substantial
evidence in the record" test to review the findings.2 The proposed
reforms could strengthen the present statutory presumption of va-
lidity to the point that validity determinations in infringement liti-
gation would demand only cursory treatment. 5 While the possibil-
ity of a later holding of invalidity by a trial court would remain, the
probability of such a holding would become increasingly remote,
particularly as the restructured Patent Office eliminates the weaker
patent applications by increased scrutiny and more stringent appli-
cation of patentability criteria. Thus, the legislative reforms could
reduce the judicial suspicion of patents, make patent law enforce-
221. The proposed bills note that willful false statements made to a federal agency are
punishable under the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), by fine or imprisonment
or both. See S. 23, § 25(c); S. 214, § 25(c); S. 473, § 25(c).
222. See note 204 supra.
223. Although harassment could result from the reexamination proceedings, ef. note 213
supra, the Patent Office would seem the logical place in which to expend the resources
required to make such determinations, rather than in district and circuit courts applying
differing standards of patentability. See notes 154-55 supra & accompanying text; Appendix
B infra.
224. Fortas, supra note 40, at 819.
225. Id. See also United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709,715 (1963) ("The term
'substantial evidence' in particular has become a term of art to describe the basis on which
an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court.").
226. See note 210 supra & accompanying text.
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ment less complex, and make the creation and application of nebu-
lous standards by the judiciary less necessary.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding efforts and desires to revise the patenting pro-
cess, legislative reform has been painfully slow.2 1 While Blonder-
Tongue and other decisions have made broad changes in the field
of patent law, they may not have furthered the overall interests of
the patent system. Hopefully, they will stimulate legislative action
to effect fundamental changes in the patenting process. Should leg-
islative reform not be forthcoming, however, the courts applying the
standards of equitable review established in Blonder-Tongue should
not hesitate to relitigate validity determinations. Only by such reli-
tigations can the courts refine the standards of equitable review, as
well as the standards of patentability and obviousness, through ap-
propriate appellate channels.25
227. See note 199 supra. Senator Hart, however, whose bills have advocated more drastic
reform than other proposals, introduced his present bill with the hopeful statement: "Ibelieve
that we are close to a consensus on the subcommittee and hope that the 94th Congress will
enact legislation modernizing the Patent Code." 121 CoNG. ERc. S1482 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
1975).
228. The final appellate tribunal, the Supreme Court, unfortunately has declined to answer
specific questions regarding the application of Blonder-Tongue. See Safe Flight Instrument
Corp. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 482 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 843 (1973);
Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 726 (1973)
(both parties appealing for clarification of Blonder-Tongue); Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 474 F.2d 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Penn
Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd mem., 479 F.2d
1328 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Parker-Sweeper Co. v. E.T. Rugg Co.,
474 F.2d 950 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973).
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